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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article continues the analysis and discussion of the conflicts
and problems that beset a dispersed and decentralized growth manage-
ment control system, as discussed in Washington's Way: Dispersed En-
forcement of Growth Management Controls and the Crucial Role of
NGOs.1 That article explained how Washington politicians, in an effort
to combat urban sprawl, created a dispersed, "bottom-up" approach to
growth management by enacting the Washington Growth Management
Act (GMA). The enforcement mechanism provided under the GMA,
however, was not mandated to a single government entity; rather, it was
left to citizens and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) acting at the
local level.2 In order to ensure local legislative actions comply with the
GMA, private citizens and NGOs must petition one of three quasi-
adjudicative agencies known as growth management hearings boards.3
One of the most prominent NGOs in enforcing the GMA is Fu-
turewise. Formerly known as 1000 Friends of Washington, Futurewise is
the most notable NGO whose efforts have proven to be effective in pro-
tecting farms and forests while building vibrant urban areas in accord
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Angeles. The authors are appreciative of the careful editing and insightful comments of
Michael Boska, Ryan Espegard, and the Seattle University Law Review editors.
ttJ.D., Vermont Law School, 2007. The author is indebted to Hank for the opportunity to write this
Article with him; the editing assistance of Ryan Espegard and Jeff Eustis; the mentorship of Tim
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1. Henry W. McGee, Jr., Washington's Way: Decentralized Enforcement of Growth Manage-
ment Controls and the Crucial Role of NGOs, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. I (2007).
2. See generally id.
3. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.250-310 (2006).
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with GMA goals and requirements.4 Organized by some of the GMA
legislation's framers, some of whom are still on its Board of Directors,
Futurewise provides a means for ordinary citizens from all walks of life
and occupations to actively participate in local land use matters identified
in the GMA. 5
Despite Futurewise's success, critics of Washington's GMA en-
forcement mechanism argue that with no centralized state approval of
local comprehensive plans and development regulations, relying upon
citizens to petition hearings boards for review of local actions leads to
sporadic and haphazard enforcement.6 The general population lacks the
knowledge, time, and resources to enforce the GMA on a voluntary ba-
sis. NGOs must rely on contributions and creative fundraising to enforce
the GMA. 7 This reliance means that even the best-intentioned NGOs
lack the wherewithal to investigate and litigate every county and city's
adoption or modification of its comprehensive plan and development
regulations. Even if an NGO could do this, it probably would not fully
represent the complete statutory intention of the Washington Legislature.
Whatever the pitfalls of Washington's decentralized enforcement of
the GMA, this Article has deeper concerns. Notwithstanding the self-
evident handicaps of enforcement by volunteerism, many developers and
local governments that are dependent on property and sales taxes for
revenue 8 argue for greater discretion in interpreting the GMA and higher
standards of proof in order to insulate them from decisions adverse to
their economic fortunes. If the decentralized enforcement is to continue
to possess efficacy, the Washington State Department of Community
Trade and Economic Development (CTED) must be able to create mini-
mum guidelines that must be followed by local governments, and growth
management hearings boards must be able to rely on precedent to estab-
lish general standards. Part II of this Article discusses the burdens of
proof and standards of review required by the GMA, before describing in
Part III the hearings boards' ability to provide precedent for future deci-
sions. Part IV concludes with suggestions on how to resolve these is-
sues.
4. See McGee, supra note 1, at 26-30.
5. Id. at 23-26.
6. Id. at 10-14.
7. See id. at 33.
8. Washington does not have a state personal or corporate income tax. Local governments'
dependence on sales and property taxes often functions as an incentive for the municipalities to
encourage development through other means, such as relaxed development regulations. See WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 82, 84 (2006).
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II. BOARD DECISION-MAKING: BURDENS & STANDARDS
A thorough analysis of the burden of proof, quantum of proof, and
standard of review under the GMA is necessary because the Act does not
properly differentiate these burdens and standards. The murky waters of
these burdens and standards have resulted in many boards, courts, and
practitioners not clearly stating basic principles. 9 This confusion has left
the door open for developers and local governments to argue that, be-
cause comprehensive plans and development regulations are valid upon
adoption and because local governments may consider "local circum-
stances,"10 hearings boards possess limited authority to find local actions
noncompliant."1 Public interest groups, such as Futurewise, argue for
less constrained interpretations.' 2  To clean up the quagmire, a better
resolution of what the burdens and standards are is necessary.
A. General Principles of Burdens & Standards
The inquiry of the GMA's burdens and standards begins by defin-
ing "burden of proof," "quantum of proof," and "standard of review."
'1 3
Burden of proof and quantum of proof are evidentiary standards em-
ployed by the trier of fact.14 Burden of proof contains two separate com-
ponents: the burdens of persuasion and production.' 5  The burdens of
persuasion and production typically rest initially with the plaintiff or pe-
titioner, although the legislature may alter the assignment. 16
The party that has the burden of persuasion must persuade the trier
of fact of the correctness of its position.' 7 In the rare situation in which
9. See, e.g., infra Part II.B.2, regarding the shifting of the burden of production in a series of
cases involving the City of Moses Lake and Grant County. Many other examples are provided
throughout this Article.
10. See §§ 36.70A.070(5)(a), .110(2), .320(1), .3201.
11. City of Bremerton v. Kitsap County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 04-3-0009c, at 22
(Aug. 9, 2004). Decisions of the hearings boards are published on the boards' website at
http://www.gmhb.wa.gov and are available on Westlaw. The case number format is "XX-X-
XXXX," with the first two digits representing the year the petition was filed, the last four digits
representing the order in which the petition was filed, and middle digit representing which board the
case is before. The Eastern Board is "1," the Western Board is "2," and the Central Board is "3."
For the purposes of this Article, Board decisions are cited as follows: "abbreviated caption, GMHB
No. XX-X-XXXX, Decision at xx (date)."
12. City of Bremerton, GMHB No. 04-3-0009c, at 22 (Aug. 9, 2004).
13. Thomas A. Mayes, Perry A. Zirkel & Dixie Snow Huefner, Allocating the Burden of Proof
in Administrative and Judicial Proceedings Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
108 W. VA. L. REV. 27, 33-36 (2005).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 33-34.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 34.
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both parties' positions are equally worthy, the finder of fact finds in fa-
vor of the party without the burden.18 The burden of persuasion stays
with the same party throughout the fact-finding process, usually the peti-
tioner. 19
While the burden of persuasion relates to the parties' position on
the facts or law, the burden of production relates to the parties' produc-
tion of evidence.20 The party with the burden of production must present
sufficient evidence to prove each element of a claim. 21 In many cases,
the burden of production may necessarily shift to the opposing party to
produce sufficient evidence to disprove each element. 22 When the bur-
den of production shifts to the respondent, the petitioner retains the bur-
den of persuading the finder of fact that the respondent's evidence is in-
sufficient or irrelevant.
23
While the burden of production relates to the parties' production of
evidence for each element, quantum of proof relates to the amount of
production necessary. 24 The quantum of production is the amount of evi-
dence necessary to have the court rule in the party's favor when the
party's evidence is balanced against the opponent's evidence. 25 "Typical
quantums of proof include 'preponderance of evidence,' 'clear and con-
vincing evidence,' and 'beyond a reasonable doubt.'
26
Standard of review is a wholly different concept from burden of
proof and quantum of proof. Whereas a trier of fact employs a burden of
proof and a quantum of proof, only tribunals serving in an appellate ca-
pacity apply a standard of review. 27  The standard of review is the
amount of scrutiny with which "[an appellate] tribunal reviews the fac-
tual findings of a lower tribunal.,
28
The potential standards of review, from least deferential to greatest,
include "de novo," "substantial evidence," "abuse of discretion," "clearly
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 33-34.
21. Id. at 33.
22. Id. at 34. For example, if a petitioner demonstrated that a local government zoned one
density unit per acre in a rural area designation contrary to hearing board decisions, which generally
hold that rural densities must be no more than one unit per four acres, the local government would
have the burden of producing evidence that it either did not in fact zone at such density or had a
valid reason based on local circumstances to zone at such density.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 34-35.





erroneous," and "arbitrary or capricious. ''29  As the standard of review
becomes more deferential to the lower decision, the appellate tribunal
will more likely affirm the decision.3° Under the de novo standard, the
appellate tribunal decides the facts "as new" with no deference to the
lower court's findings. 31 Under the "substantial evidence" standard, the
appellate tribunal will uphold a lower tribunal's findings "if a reasonable
person could find the evidence sufficient to arrive at the [tribunal's con-
clusion]," even if a different result is conceivable.32 Under the "clearly
erroneous" standard, the appellate tribunal will uphold a lower tribunal's
findings unless the appellate tribunal is "left with firm and definite con-
viction that a mistake has been committed., 33 Finally, under the "arbi-
trary or capricious" standard, the appellate tribunal will not reverse
unless the lower tribunal made a "willful and unreason[ed decision]...
without consideration and in disregard of the facts and circumstances of
the case."34
When the appellate tribunal applies the standard of review, the tri-
bunal views the appealed decision in light of the requisite burden of
proof and quantum of proof before the lower tribunal.35 Burden of proof
and quantum of proof are only evidentiary standards, but the standard of
review is applicable to both findings of fact and law.36 Usually, appellate
tribunals apply the standard of review of de novo to findings of law.37
When the agency or lower tribunal has specific expertise, appellate tri-
bunals will give more deference to findings of law.3 8
29. Constitutional law students are also familiar with the standards of review of "strict scru-
tiny," "intermediate scrutiny," and "rational-basis review." Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State
and Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 11,46 (1994).
30. Mayes, et al., supra note 13, at 36. The standards may apply to different situations. For
example, "substantial evidence" is usually a standard for review of factual determinations; "clearly
erroneous" usually a standard for review of legal determinations; and "arbitrary or capricious" usu-
ally a standard for review of discretionary decisions.
31. Id. at 35.
32. Id. at 35-36.
33. King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 543, 552,14
P.3d 133, 138 (2000) (quoting Dep't of Ecology v. Pub. Util. Dist. 1, 121 Wash. 2d 179, 201, 849
P.2d 646, 657-58 (1993)).
34. Sweitzer v. Indus. Ins. Comm. of Washington, 116 Wash. 398, 401, 199 P. 724, 725
(1921); see also Kunsch, supra note 29, at 41.
35. Mayes, et al., supra note 13, at 35-36.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Overton Park v. Wash. State Econ. Assistance Auth., 96 Wash. 2d 552, 555, 637 P.2d 652,
654 (1981).
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B. GMA's Burdens & Standards
Section 36.70A.320 of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW)
provides the requisite burdens and standards for review applied by the
Growth Management Hearings Boards. 39 To the consternation of many
practitioners before the hearings boards, and undoubtedly to many
county commissioners, city council members, planners, and local partici-
pants as well, the Washington Legislature created in section 320 an inco-
herent linguistic rubric of the burdens and standards to be applied by the
hearings boards. As a result, the burdens and standards have been sub-
ject to much debate. A 1997 amendment to section 320 provided no
greater help.40 At the core of the problem is the legislature's failure to
understand basic general legal theory and application regarding burdens
of proof and standards of review.
The first cause of the confusion is not the fault of the legislature.
Rather, developers and local governments have frequently misunderstood
or misrepresented the significance of subsection 320(l)'s presumption of
validity for local legislative actions. Second, the legislature failed to
properly label the burdens of proof, production, and persuasion in sub-
section 320(2). Third, the legislature failed to provide a quantum of
proof. Fourth, the legislature misunderstood the relevance of a standard
of review for board decisions. With these issues at hand, an analysis of
what to make of the requisite burdens and standards under the GMA em-
barks. The analysis concludes, as often issues before hearings boards do,
with an inquiry into what standard of review the courts apply on appeals
from the boards' decisions.
1. GMA's Presumption of Validity
Since 1991, the GMA has applied a presumption of validity to local
legislative actions.4 Subsection 320(1) provides that "comprehensive
plans and development regulations, and amendments thereto, adopted
under [the GMA] are presumed valid.' ' 2 While some argue this pre-
sumption of validity affects the burdens and standards applicable to re-
view by hearings boards,43 it does not. Instead, the presumption of
39. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320 (2006).
40. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.320, .3201 (1997).
41. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320(i) (1991).
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320(1) (2006).
43. The hearings boards are sometimes confused as well. In Shulman, the Central Board con-
cluded, "[s]howing either an arbitrary or discriminatory action is insufficient to overcome the pre-
sumption of validity that actions of cities and counties are granted by the Act." Shulman v. City of
Bellevue, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 95-3-0076, at 12 (May 6, 1996). This statement clearly
confuses the presumption of validity with the quantum of proof, discussed infra. See also Kent
[Vol. 31:549
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validity is an attempt to avoid Oregon's "top-down" approach and to set
the stage for Washington's special appellate process of local decisions.
In Oregon, decisions are not valid until approved by a state com-
mission.44 This imposed a strong, top-down approach, an approach the
Washington Legislature intended to avoid.45  Oregon's approach also
exposed local decisions to a window in which development rights may
vest, which local governments avoided by imposing development mora-
46toria.
The Washington Legislature wanted the local decisions to be en-
forceable by the municipality until found noncompliant or invalid,47
thereby preventing development rights from vesting in the interim under
the old local land use regulations. This goal necessarily required specific
statutory language providing for a presumption of validity. However,
there is no basis to argue the GMA's presumption of validity affects the
burdens of proof before the hearings boards; thus, the legislative intent
for decentralized enforcement with an effective petition and review pro-
cedure was the reason for the presumption of validity, not to affect the
burdens or standards.
2. GMA's Burden of Proof
To the distress of many GMA litigants, Subsection 320(2) provides
that "the burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate that any action taken
by a state agency, county, or city under this chapter is not in compliance
with the requirements of this chapter., 48  This subsection does not de-
lineate which burden the petitioner possesses: persuasion, production, or
both.49 Presumably "demonstrate" means "persuade." As such, the bur-
den of persuasion is assigned to the petitioner. The Washington Court of
Appeals has found that this burden does not shift. 50 In other words, the
C.A.R.E.S. III v. City of Kent, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 03-3-0012, at 6 (Dec. 1, 2003);
FACT v. City of Bellevue, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 02-3-0014, at 6 (Mar. 17, 2003).
44. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.090(2)(a) (2006).
45. McGee, supra note 1, at 10-14.
46. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.505-540 (2006).
47. McGee, supra note 1, at 10-14.
48. The local governments act as a tribunal of first impression while hearings boards are the
appellate tribunal. This has a strange effect. Usually the burden of proof is assigned at the first
tribunal, but here the first tribunal is a legislative body. The local government has the burden of
enacting a rational law that is compliant with the GMA. Since the local legislative action is pre-
sumed valid, the burden of ensuring compliance with the GMA does not arise until a petitioner with
standing meets her burden and quantum of proof.
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.310(2) (2006).
50. City of Redmond v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 116 Wash. App. 48,
54-56, 65 P.3d 337, 341-42 (2003).
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burden of persuasion always stays with the petitioner before the hearings
board;5" undecided is whether the burden of production sticks as well.
52
Presumably "demonstrate" also means "produce." As such, the
burden of production is also initially assigned to the petitioner.53 Local
governments often argue that the "burden of proof' cannot shift from the
petitioner to the respondent.54 If this were the case for both the burden of
persuasion and burden of production, the result would defy logic. If the
burden of production never shifted, the petitioner could never win.
While courts have not explicitly addressed the issue of burden of produc-
tion, logic dictates that the burden of production must shift at some point
such that the respondent must refute the evidence proffered by the peti-
tioner. For example, a county would be hard pressed to explain why it
exclusively zoned skyscrapers to agricultural lands. Thus, the burden of
production must shift.55
Several cases indicate that the boards do shift the burden of produc-
tion. There are three Eastern Board decisions, each of which captioned
City of Moses Lake v. Grant County, which demonstrate how the burden
of production shifts. In Case No. 98-1-0003, Moses Lake petitioned the
Board for review of Grant County's interim ordinance, which designated
2.5-acre densities in rural areas.56 The Eastern Board found that Moses
Lake did not provide sufficient evidence that the designation was clearly
erroneous.57 In Case No. 99-1-0016, Moses Lake petitioned the Board
51. Id.
52. Cf Wells v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 100 Wash. App. 657, 660-60, 997
P.2d 405, 408 (2000)(explaining how the burden of production may shift once the hearing board
makes a determination of invalidity).
53. However, in cases concerning whether a city or county used best available science (BAS),
the burden of production is initially assigned to the local government to prove it included BAS, then
shifts to the petitioner to prove the used science was inadequate. See Ferry County v. Concerned
Friends of Ferry County, 155 Wash. 2d 824, 834, 123 P.3d 102, 107 (2005); Honesty in Envtl.
Analysis & Legislation (HEAL) v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 96 Wash. App.
522, 532, 979 P.2d 864, 870-71 (1999).
54. See Hensley v. Snohomish County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 03-3-0009c, at 25-26
(Sept. 22, 2003).
55. See discussion, infra section Il.B.3 (determining when the burden shifts is a question of the
requisite "quantum of proof").
56. City of Moses Lake v. Grant County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 98-1-0003 (Oct. 7,
1998).
57. Id. The Board held the following:
[W]e find no evidence the subject interim ordinance has had any effect other than that in-
tended in its original enactment. Petitioners argue information is not available which
would support their claim that urban sprawl is continuing in Grant County. The County,
however, does provide information in the record that supports its contention that urban
sprawl has been largely curtailed since enactment of the interim ordinance. Petitioners
have not provided evidence which supports a decision that the County's action are clearly
erroneous. With the absence of evidence supporting its claims, the Board must also con-
clude the County has complied with the SEPA requirements.
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for review of Grant County's Comprehensive Land Use Plan, which
again designated 2.5-acre densities in rural areas. 58 This time the Eastern
Board found sufficient evidence and invalidated the designation. 59  In
Case No. 01_1_0010,60 Moses Lake petitioned the Board for review of
Grant County's interim ordinance, which again designated 5-acre densi-
ties in historically undeveloped rural areas. 6' The Board found that
Moses Lake did not provide sufficient evidence that the designation was
clearly erroneous.62 Thus, the City of Moses Lake v. Grant County deci-
sions, without explicitly analyzing the shift of the burden of production,
clearly demonstrate that the Boards recognize that the burden of produc-
63tion must necessarily shift at some point.
Id.
58. City of Moses Lake v. Grant County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 99-1-0016 (May 23,
2000).
59. Id. The Board stated the following:
The Board takes specific notice of the parcels zoned at a density of I DU-2.5 acres. The
area under scrutiny is 8,717 acres in rural areas. This approximately 15 square miles is
spread throughout the unincorporated area of Grant County. The County designated
these areas in addition to the 22 RAIDS, some of which allow residential development at
similar or greater density. This creates an impermissible pattern of urban growth in the
rural area. The Board cannot conclude that such a large area that would permit, as a
matter of right, over 3,486 land-consumptive 2.5-acre lots, is anything other than classic
low-density sprawl. While RCW 36.70A.070(5)(d) allows higher density in the rural
area, the County did not establish these lot sizes under that exception or any other.
Id.
60. City of Moses Lake v. Grant County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 0 1-1-0010 (Nov. 20,
2001).
61. Id.
In support of this contention, the City notes that the Boards have previously held that I
and 2.5 acre lots constitute urban growth and are prohibited in rural areas, whereas 10
acre residential lots are rural and, therefore, do not constitute urban growth. However,
as to five acre lots, the City concedes that the Boards have held they are not a per se vio-
lation of the Growth Management Act. Rather, five acres lots require increased scrutiny
to ensure that their number, location, and configuration do not constitute urban growth,
do not present an undue threat to large scale natural resource lands and critical areas,
will not thwart the long term flexibility to expand Urban Growth Areas, and will not
otherwise be inconsistent with the goals and requirements of the GMA.
Id.
62. Id. "The City of Moses Lake has not presented evidence that leaves the Board with a firm
and definite conviction that interim Ordinance No. 2001-49-CC permits the development of rural
lots in such a pattern so as to constitute impermissible urban growth." Id.
63. Similarly, when a board makes a determination of invalidity in a subsequent compliance
hearing, the County has the burden to prove they have corrected the non-compliant issues. Wells v.
W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., Civ. No. 98-2-00546-3 (Order Remanding Case, Sept. 25,
1998).
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3. GMA's Quantum of Proof
The relevant portion of RCW section 36.70A.320(3) originally
stated that "the board shall find compliance unless it finds by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the state agency, county, or city erroneously
interpreted or applied this chapter., 64 Thus, the original language pro-
vided the quantum of proof of "preponderance of the evidence." 65 It is
possible that the standard of review was "erroneous interpretation," but it
is hard to see how such a standard would be helpful, 66 and, in reality,
Boards never applied such a standard of review beyond the "quantum of
proof." The legislature amended this section in 1997.67 The relevant
portion now provides that "the board shall find compliance unless it de-
termines that the action by the state agency, county, or city is clearly er-
roneous in view of the entire record before the board and in light of the
goals and requirements of [the GMA]. ' '68 So, the 1997 amendments re-
moved the quantum of proof and better defined the meaning of "errone-
ous interpretation."
In 1997, the legislature also adopted a section declaring the intent
of the amendments, codified as section 3201.69 Section 3201 states, in
part, that "the legislature intends that the boards apply a more deferential
standard of review to actions of counties and cities than the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard provided for under existing law.",70 The
legislature wanted to be more deferential to local decisions. However, in
doing so, the legislature eliminated the quantum of proof Apparently
the legislature was confused in thinking "preponderance of the evidence"
was a standard of review rather than the evidentiary standard of quantum
of proof. Without a quantum of proof, the petitioners could never pro-
vide enough evidence to win because, technically, the boards could never
weigh the presented evidence.71 So, in practice, the Boards must neces-
sarily find and use another quantum. The legislature did provide a
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320(3) (1991).
65. Id.
66. "Erroneous interpretation" is not a recognized standard of proof used by courts. The phrase
would need to be prefaced by an adjective for a court to determine the degree to which the appellant
must prove her case.




71. For example, consider a balancing scale. If there is only a beam without a fulcrum to bal-
ance the beam, one could never determine the weight of any mass placed on the beam. The quantum
of proof is much like the fulcrum: a tribunal cannot weigh the evidence without knowing when the
evidence tips in favor of the petitioner's position.
[Vol. 31:549
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standard of review.7 2 Although unusual, the standard of review acts as
the quantum of proof.
4. GMA's Standard of Review by Hearings Boards
RCW section 36.70A.320(3) plainly states that the standard of re-
view applied by hearings boards is "clearly erroneous." The Washington
Supreme Court in King County held that "[t]o find an action 'clearly er-
roneous,' the growth management hearings board must be left with the
firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been committed. 7 3 Re-
cently, the Washington Supreme Court footnoted:
The relevant question is the degree of deference to be granted under
the "clearly erroneous standard." The amount is neither unlimited
nor does it approximate a rubber stamp. It requires the Board to
give the county's actions a "critical review" and is a "more intense
standard of review" than the arbitrary and capricious standard....
And even the more deferential "arbitrary and capricious standard"
must not be used as a "rubber stamp" of administrative actions.74
The definition of "clearly erroneous" is fairly transparent. Less
clear is whether the clearly erroneous standard applies to the local legis-
lative action, the local government's findings of fact, or the local gov-
ernment's findings of law. If the legislature simply provided a quantum
of proof instead of a standard of review, this would not be a question; the
hearings boards would make findings of fact, interpret the GMA goals
and requirements, and then determine whether the local legislative action
was clearly erroneous. But under a standard of review, the appellate tri-
bunal reviews the lower tribunal's findings of fact and law based on the
standard, although the standards may be different for the questions of
fact and the questions of law. Thus, if the latter approach were taken,
hearings boards would have to ask whether a local government's inter-
pretation of the GMA was clearly erroneous. Applying the "clearly
72. The legislature may have provided a standard of review instead of a quantum of proof in
reflection of the fact that a lower tribunal exists-the local governmental legislature. This is a bit
confusing since the judicial evidentiary standards do not apply to legislative action. While judicial
evidentiary standards do not apply to legislative action, the GMA does provide some statutory evi-
dentiary standards such as "show your work" requirements.
73. King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 543, 552,
14 P.3d 133, 138 (2000) (quoting Dep't of Ecology v. Pub. Util. Dist. 1, 121 Wash. 2d 179, 201, 849
P.2d 646, 657-58 (1993)); see also Cooper Point Ass'n v. Thurston County, 108 Wash. App. 429, 31
P.3d 28 (2001), affid, 148 Wash. 2d 1, 57 P.3d 1156 (2002).
74. Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 161 Wash. 2d
415, 435 n.8, 166 P.3d 1198, 1209 n.8 (2007).
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erroneous" standard of review to findings of law would provide much
greater deference to local legislative actions.
Although the objective of the 1997 amendments was to provide
greater deference to local governments,75 the extent of the legislature's
intent in granting deference still must be determined. Did the legislature
mean to increase the quantum and give local governments the ability to
be the primary interpreters of the GMA? At least one Washington Su-
preme Court justice seems to think this was exactly the purpose of the
1997 amendment. In Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, Justice
James Johnson dissented, stating that "if there is a plausible argument
that some other enforcement mechanism might further the goals of the
GMA..., the County is free to consider any such proposal. The Board
or a court may not make that decision for the County because neither
possesses legislative powers. 76 In other words, Justice Johnson would
willingly "rubber stamp" local actions so long as the local government
could demonstrate a "plausible" reason for its action, even if the logical
connection to the GMA's goals and requirements was tenuous.77 Only
Justice Richard Sanders joined Justice Johnson's dissent.78
The other five justices did not follow Justice Johnson. Although
the majority did not engage in an in-depth rebuttal to Justice Johnson,
preferring to respond in a footnote,79 ample reasons exist for finding that
"clearly erroneous" means something more than rubber stamp approval
of local decisions. If the legislature intended in 1997 to strip the Boards
of the authority to interpret the GMA goals and requirements and apply
the law to the facts, the legislature would have been much more explicit.
Instead, subsection 320(3) states that "[t]he board shall find compliance
unless it determines that the action by the state agency, county, or city is
clearly erroneous in view of the entire record before the board and in
light of the goals and requirements of [the GMA].,, 80 Thus, the statute
clearly separates the review of the local legislative action from interpre-
tation of "the goals and requirements of the GMA." Therefore, a Board
will first interpret the GMA goals and requirements for it, and then apply
this law when reviewing the local government's action.
75. See McGee, supra note 1, at 10-14.
76. Swinomish, 161 Wash. 2d at 441, 166 P.3d at 1212 (Johnson, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part).
77. Apparently Justice Johnson would also like to decide the issue of whether the hearings
boards are unconstitutional as well. Justice Johnson states in a footnote, "[t]his opinion does not
reach the broader constitutional question of whether these sui generis unelected boards, appointed by
the governor, may overrule county legislators and micromanage land use plans for counties." Id. at
n. I (Johnson J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
78. Id. at 443-44, 166 P.3d at 1213.
79. Id. at 435 n.8, 166 P.3d at 1209 n.8.
80. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320(3) (2006).
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Boards may yet still owe the clearly erroneous deference to local in-
terpretations of law if local legislative "action" is read by courts to in-
clude both the local government's findings of fact and conclusions of
law. This argument may be supported by the GMA's statutory language.
Although "action" is not defined in the GMA's definitions section, 81 sub-
section 130(1)(b) defines "legislative action" as "the adoption of a reso-
lution or ordinances following notice and a public hearing." Subsection
320(1) also indicates that "action" refers to the legislative actions of
"comprehensive plans and development regulations." Subsection 280(1),
which limits the scope of the hearings boards' review, suggests that "ac-
tion" refers to "plans, development regulations, or amendments." In en-
acting or amending comprehensive plans or development regulations,
local governments are forced to interpret the GMA because the Legisla-
ture created the GMA with "politically necessary omissions, internal in-
consistencies, and intentionally vague language., 82 The question then
arises, do the local government's interpretations of the inconsistent and
vague GMA become part of its legislative action such that the hearings
boards must uphold the action unless it is clearly erroneous?
According to the Washington Supreme Court, the answer is no. In
King County v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings
Board, the Washington Supreme Court held that courts must give "sub-
stantial weight to the Boards' interpretations . . ." because of their spe-
cific expertise in the GMA.83 Thus, if courts must defer to hearings
boards' interpretations because of their specific expertise, it follows that
local governments must follow as well. If boards granted deference to
local interpretations by applying the clearly erroneous standard to ques-
tions of law, the boards' interpretations would be undermined and not
worthy of deference by the courts. Thus, hearings boards must not defer
to local interpretations of the GMA, but rely on their own specific exper-
tise with the GMA.
5. Court Review of Board Decisions
When a board decision is appealed to a court, the court reviews the
board decision, not the local legislative action.84 Therefore, the court
applies a different standard of review from that applied by the board.
81. See § 36.70A.030.
82. Richard L. Settle & Charles G. Gavigan, The Growth Management Revolution in Washing-
ton: Past, Present, and Future, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 867, 881 (1993).
83. King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 543, 553,
14 P.3d 133, 139 (2000) (citing Diehl v. Mason County, 94 Wash. App. 645, 651. 972 P.2d 543, 546
(1999)).
84. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.300(5) (2006).
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The courts apply the standards of review as provided by the Washington
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 85 Section 570(3) of the APA pro-
vides nine separate standards of review depending on what is being re-
viewed.86
First, paragraph 570(3)(a) states that a court shall grant relief from a
quasi-adjudicative order if "the order, or the statute or rule on which the
order is based, is in violation of constitutional provisions on its face or as
applied. 87 No deference is given to the board's decision under a claim
concerning constitutionality; interpretation of the state constitution is the
sole providence of the courts. At least four cases have unsuccessfully
challenged board decisions or the GMA based on constitutionality, in-
cluding Thurston County v. Western Washington Growth Management
Hearings Board,88 Peste v. Mason County,89 Diehl v. Mason County,90
and Snohomish County v. Anderson.
91
Second, paragraph 570(3)(b) states that a court shall grant relief
from a quasi-adjudicative order if "the order is outside the statutory au-
thority or jurisdiction of the agency conferred by any provision of law.',
92
The courts afford no deference to the board's decision regarding statu-
tory authority and agency jurisdiction.
Third, paragraph 570(3)(c) states that a court shall grant relief from
a quasi-adjudicative order if "the agency has engaged in unlawful proce-
dure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow a prescribed
procedure. 93 Again, the courts afford no deference to the board regard-
ing such questions.
Fourth, paragraph 570(3)(d) states that a court shall grant relief




88. Thurston County v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 137 Wash. App. 781, 792-93,
154 P.3d 959, 964-65 (2007) (holding GMA's participation standing was constitutional because
boards are not courts).
89. Peste v. Mason County, 133 Wash. App. 456, 471-73, 136 P.3d 140, 148-50 (2006) (hold-
ing Mason County's comprehensive plan and development regulations did not constitute a taking
under the Fifth Amendment or violate substantive due process because they were enacted pursuant to
the GMA).
90. Diehl v. Mason County, 94 Wash. App. 645, 661-62, 972 P.2d 543, 551-52 (1999) (hold-
ing the GMA was not unconstitutionally vague and that the legislature's delegation of review author-
ity to hearings boards did not violate the separation of powers doctrine).
91. Snohomish County v. Anderson, 124 Wash. App. 834, 838-39, 881 P.2d 240, 243-44
(1994) (holding constitutional claims that GMA violated separation of powers and granted an exces-
sive delegation of power to the governor to impose penalties for noncompliant localities were not
ripe for review).




interpreted or applied the law." 94  The Washington Supreme Court in
Redmond stated that "[courts] essentially review such questions de
novo."95 Although courts "accord deference to an agency interpretation
of the law where the agency has specialized expertise in dealing with
such issues, ' '96 courts are the "final arbiter ... concerning conclusions of
state law... and conclusions of state law entered by an administrative
agency or court ... are not binding., 97 The Washington Supreme Court
has also held, "the Board's legal conclusions are reviewed 'de novo, giv-
ing substantial weight to the Board's interpretation of the statute it ad-
ministers."'' 98 Thus, although courts receive a fresh look at any question
of law concerning the GMA, because the hearings boards have special
expertise in GMA while courts do not, courts will rely heavily on boards'
conclusions of law.
Fifth, paragraph 570(3)(e) states that a court shall grant relief from
a quasi-adjudicative order if "the order is not supported by evidence that
is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the
court." 99  Under this "substantial evidence" standard, the Washington
Supreme Court has stated that "[i]n reviewing the agency's findings of
fact under RCW 34.05.570(3)(e), the test of substantial evidence is 'a
sufficient quantity of evidence to persuade a fair-minded person of the
truth or correctness of the order."' 100 Applying this standard is complex
because the court must determine whether a board's evidentiary finding
that a local action was clearly erroneous was supported by substantial
evidence.' 10 On mixed questions of law and fact, courts determine the
law independently, "giving substantial weight to the agency's view of the
law it administers," then apply the law to the facts as found by the
board. °2
94. § 34.05.570(3)(d).
95. City of Redmond v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 136 Wash. 2d 38, 46,
959 P.2d 1091, 1094 (1998).
96. Id. (citing Overton v. Wash. State Econ. Assistance Auth., 96 Wash. 2d 552, 555, 637 P.2d
652, 654 (1981)).
97. Id. (citing Leschi Improvement Council v. Wash. State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wash. 2d
271, 286, 525 P.2d 774, 804 (1974)).
98. Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 161 Wash. 2d
415, 423, 166 P.3d 1198, 1203 (2007)(quoting King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt.
Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 543, 552, 14 P.3d 133, 139 (2000)).
99. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(3)(e)(2006).
100. King County, 142 Wash. 2d at 552, 14 P.3d at 139 (quoting Callecod v. Wash. State Pa-
trol, 84 Wash. App. 663, 673, 929 P.2d 510, 515 (1997)).
101. Or, alternatively, the court must determine whether a board's evidentiary finding that a
local action was not clearly erroneous was supported by substantial evidence.
102. Hamel v. Employment See. Dep't, 93 Wash. App. 140, 144, 966 P.2d 1282, 1285 (1998);
see also King County, 142 Wash. 2d at 552, 14 P.3d at 138.
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Sixth, paragraph 570(3)(f) states that a court shall grant relief from
a quasi-adjudicative order if "the agency has not decided all issues re-
quiring resolution by the agency."'10 3 Nevertheless, Boards will not ad-
dress issues that a petitioner fails to properly set forth in the petition for
review or fails to argue in the prehearing brief.
10 4
Seventh, paragraph 570(3)(g) states that a court shall grant relief
from a quasi-adjudicative order if "a motion for disqualification under
[sections] 34.05.425 or 34.12.050 was made and was improperly denied
or, if no motion was made, facts are shown to support the grant of such a
motion that were not known and were not reasonably discoverable by the
challenging party at the appropriate time for making such a motion.,
105
A disqualification typically only occurs when a hearings board member
is biased or prejudicial. 0 6 A court has never overturned a hearings board
decision based on paragraph 570(3)(g).
Eighth, paragraph 570(3)(h) states that a court shall grant relief
from a quasi-adjudicative order if "the order is inconsistent with a rule of
the agency unless the agency explains the inconsistency by stating facts
and reasons to demonstrate a rational basis for inconsistency."' 7 Be-
cause the hearings boards do not create rules, paragraph 530(h) is not
applicable unless a petitioner argues that a board's decision is inconsis-
tent with CTED's rules.
Ninth, paragraph 570(3)(i) states that a court shall grant relief from
a quasi-adjudicative order if "the order is arbitrary or capricious." ' 108 Es-
sentially this is a fallback standard because it affords the highest amount
of deference to the Boards. 109 Therefore, another standard of review
would presumably be met before the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
is satisfied.
103. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(3)(f).
104. See Sky Valley v. Snohomish County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 95-3-0068c, at 24
(Mar. 12, 1996); see also Wash. Envtl. Council v. Whatcom County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB
No. 95-2-0071 (Dec. 20, 1995); Twin Falls, Inc. v. Snohomish County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB
No. 93-3-0003c, at 18 (Sept. 7, 1993).
105. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(3)(g).
106. See § 34.05.425(3).
107. § 34.05.570(3)(h).
108. § 34.05.570(3)(i).
109. In LM/Chevron, the Central Board stated: "'Arbitrary' means to be determined by whim
or caprice'.... Washington's courts have further defined 'arbitrary and capricious' action to mean
willful and unreasoning action taken without regard to or consideration of the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the action." Lawrence Michael Invs., LLC v. Town of Woodway, Final Dec. &
Order, GMHB No. 98-3-0012 (Jan. 8, 1999) (citing The American Heritage Dictionary of the Eng-
lish Language, New College Edition, Houghton Mifflin Company 1980, at 67; see also Kendall v.
Douglas, Grant, Lincoln & Okanogan Counties Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 6, 14, 118 Wash. 2d 1, 14, 820




Each level of court, whether superior court, court of appeals, or su-
preme court, must "apply the standards of RCW 34.05 directly to the
record before the agency, sitting in the same position as the superior
court." 1 0 The party appealing the Board's decision retains the burden of
persuasion at each level of court."' The courts "review ... the Board's
decision... based on the record made before the Board."
'" 2
6. Conclusion of Burdens and Standards
When enacted, the GMA enforcement provisions were a balance
between legislative goals that often compete against one another: creat-
ing well-planned communities and fostering local decision-making.''
3
The goal of well-planned communities is diminished as the burden of
proof increases for local citizens and NGOs to prove that a local action is
inconsistent with the GMA. Additionally, public participation in the
process is also quashed as the effectiveness of the local citizens and
NGOs in appealing a local action is diminished. When local govern-
ments are granted more deference, the legislative intent of the GMA is
weakened while developers seek to profit and municipalities seek to in-
crease the tax base. Thus, correctly interpreting the GMA burdens of
proof and standards of review is imperative. Based on this section's
analysis, boards should defer to a local government's findings of fact
regarding their local circumstances unless the findings of fact are clearly
erroneous. On the other hand, the boards should apply de novo review to
a local government's interpretations of law. Although the courts are the
ultimate interpreter of the law, they should give "substantial weight" to
hearings boards' conclusions of law because the boards deal with GMA
issues on a regular basis. Knowing the appropriate standards for boards
to apply, we turn to the question of what extent the boards can base their
legal conclusions on rules and prior decisions.
110. City of Redmond v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 136 Wash. 2d 38,
44, 959 P.2d 1091, 1093 (1998).
111. King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 543, 552,
125 Wash. 2d 196, 202, 14 P.3d 133, 138 (2000).
112. Buechel v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 884 P.2d 910, 915 (Wash. 1994).
113. See generally McGee, supra note 1, at 1-2, 10-14; WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020
(2006).
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III. CTED GUIDELINES AND THE BOARDS' BRIGHT LINES
In the face of the many petitions,' 14 the hearings boards rely both on
their prior decisions and on the GMA guidelines written by the Washing-
ton Department of Community, Trade, and Economic Development
(CTED) to create some uniformity in decision-making." 5 Unfortunately,
the effectiveness of both the CTED guidelines and boards' precedents are
questionable. This Part discusses current case law regarding the guide-
lines and precedents.
A. CTED Guidelines
Enforcement of growth management becomes more "top-down"
and centralized when a state agency is given broad authority to interpret
the statute. 1 6 Providing a state agency more statutory interpretation au-
thority reduces the local governments' interpretation authority.' 17 If the
local government has less authority, the developers will not likely be able
to exercise undue influence over the adoption and amendment of com-
prehensive plans and development regulations at the local level. 18 In-
stead, the battleground moves to the public participation processes of
rulemaking. There, public interest groups are more likely to be able to
aggregate resources to fight the statutory interpretive battles before a
state agency.119
The GMA requires the CTED to adopt "minimum guidelines" for
the designation of agricultural lands, forestlands, mineral resource lands,
and critical areas. 12  The CTED also adopts guidelines that describe the
"best available science" that should be used when designating critical
areas. 121 The GMA requires counties and cities to consider both of these
guidelines when making designations. 22  In addition, the CTED pub-
lishes parallel rules to the Growth Management Act in the Washington
114. Based on the authors' tabulation of the petitions filed to the hearings boards, as posted to
the boards' websites, at least 1157 petitions were filed between 1992 and 2006. Washington State
Growth Management Hearings Boards, http://www.gmhb.wa.gov, contains links for each regional
board to the decision page for each.
115. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.190.
116. McGee, supra note 1, at 4-5.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Monitoring each county's amendments to comprehensive plans and adoptions of devel-
opment regulations is time consuming and costly. Reviewing and appealing rulemaking by a single
agency would be much simpler.
120. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.050 (2006); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 365-190-050, -060, -070,
-080 (2006).
121. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.170, 190; WASH. ADMIN. CODE 365-195-905, 910, 915, 920.
122. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.050(3); Dep't of Ecology v. City of Kent, Final Dec. &
Order, GMHB No. 05-3-0034, at 10 (Apr. 19, 2006).
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Administrative Code. At times, these parallel rules refine the GMA re-
quirements. 12  However, the principal question is to what extent local
governments must use the guidelines: not at all, merely consider, provide
justification when not followed, or must always adhere.
Numerous decisions by the Hearings Boards, 124 the Court of Ap-
peals,1 25 and the Washington Supreme Court 26 have held, or at least in-
dicated, that local governments must, at a minimum, consider the CTED
guidelines. The analysis of the degree to which local governments must
use the guidelines necessarily starts with the first relevant Washington
Supreme Court decision, City of Redmond v. Central Puget Sound
Growth Management Hearings Board.
27
Redmond concerns the designation of agricultural land by King
County. 28 The GMA requires counties and cities to designate agricul-
tural lands within their jurisdictions. 129  Under the GMA, agricultural
land is "land primarily devoted to the commercial production of horticul-
tural, viticulture, floricultural, dairy, apiary, vegetable, or animal prod-
ucts or of berries, grain, hay, straw, turf, seed, Christmas trees . . . , fin-
fish in upland hatcheries, or livestock."'130 In addition, "[t]he land must
not be already characterized by urban development and that [has] long-
term significance for the commercial production of food or other agricul-
tural products." 131 Additionally, the GMA specifically directs the local
government to "consider the guidelines established pursuant to RCW
36.70A.050.'' 132 RCW section 36.70A.050 is the section directing CTED
to establish the guidelines and states in part:
The guidelines.., shall be minimum guidelines that apply to all ju-
risdictions, but also shall allow for regional differences that exist in
Washington State. The intent of these guidelines is to assist
123. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(2) with WASH. ADMIN. CODE 365-195-310
(regarding the housing element).
124. See 1000 Friends of Wash. v. City of Anacortes, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 03-2-
0017 (Feb. 10, 2004); see also Olympic Envtl. Council v. Jefferson County, Final Dec. & Order,
GMHB No. 94-2-0017 (Feb. 16, 1995); Save Our Butte Save Our Basin Soc'y v. Chelan County,
Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 94-1-0015 (Aug. 8, 1994); English v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of
Columbia County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 93-1-0002 (Nov. 12, 1993); Twin Falls, Inc. v.
Snohomish County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 93-3-0003c at 21 (Sept. 7, 1993).
125. Quadrant v. State Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 119 Wash. App. 562, 81 P.3d 918 (2003).
126. City of Redmond v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 136 Wash. 2d 38,
959 P.2d 1091 (1998).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 42-46, 959 P.2d at 1092-94.
129. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.170(l)(a) (2006).
130. § 36.70A.030(2).
131. § 36.70A.170(1)(a), .030(2).
132. § 36.70A.170(2).
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counties and cities in designating the classification of agricultural
lands, forestlands, mineral resource lands, and critical areas .... 133
In classifying agricultural lands of long-term significance, the
CTED guidelines require local governments to consider "growing capac-
ity, productivity and soil composition of the land." The guidelines also
require local governments to consider "the combined effects of proximity
to population areas and the possibility of more intense uses of the land"
as indicated by ten listed factors.1 34 Specifically, local governments are
required to use the land-capability classification system of the United
States Department of Agricultural Soil Conservation Service in making
their assessment. 135 Agricultural land designations should be based on
the "prime" and "unique" classifications of the land-capability system.
136
If the "prime" and "unique" classifications are not used, the local gov-
ernments must report the rationale to CTED.
137
The boards and courts, not to mention local governments, have
found parsing the agricultural land requirements difficult. The test for
designating agricultural land is long and has multiple factors. Uncer-
tainty leers at every bend; the meaning and weight of every factor in the
analysis is vague. Most troublesome is the uncertainty as to what weight
to give to the CTED guidelines.
In Redmond, the Washington Supreme Court defined the appropri-
ate test for designating agricultural land as consisting of two parts: first,
whether the land was "primarily devoted to" agricultural uses; and sec-
ond, whether the land had "long-term significance for the commercial
production of food or other agricultural products.' 3 8 With regard to the
second half of the test, the court suggested that the CTED guidelines
must be at least considered.139 However, because the court first found
that Central Board failed to properly apply the first half of the test, the




134. WASH. ADM1N. CODE 365-190-050(1) (1991), available at
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/WAC/default.aspx?cite=365-190-050.
135. Id.
136. Id. § 365-190-050(2).
137. Id.
138. City of Redmond v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 136 Wash. 2d 38,
54, 959 P.2d 1091, 1098 (1998).
139. Id., 959 P.2d at 1098.
140. Id., 959 P.2d at 1098.
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Since Redmond, boards require local governments to provide a re-
cord showing that the CTED guidelines were considered. 14 1 The West-
ern Board also requires local governments to provide justification when
they do not follow the guidelines. 142  The Eastern Board and Central
Board do not go nearly as far, only holding that the guidelines are "advi-
sory rather than mandatory."'
' 43
Increasingly, it is apparent that the CTED guidelines are mandatory
guidelines which local governments must follow. In City of Des Moines
v. Puget Sound Regional Council, the Court of Appeals relied on the
CTED guidelines for interpreting the GMA's regional planning proc-
ess.144  The Court of Appeals justified leaning heavily on the CTED
Guidelines when it stated:
[W]hen a statute is ambiguous-as in the instant case-there is the
well known rule of statutory interpretation that the construction
placed upon a statute by an administrative agency charged with its
administration and enforcement, while not absolutely controlling
upon the courts, should be given great weight in determining legis-
lative intent.
145
This Court of Appeal's decision to follow the CTED guidelines contra-
dicts the Eastern and Central Boards' position that the guidelines are
"advisory rather than mandatory."1 46
Likewise, in Manke Lumber Co. v. Diehl, Mason County's method
of designating forestlands was challenged. 147 The requirements for for-
estland designation are substantially similar to those of agricultural
land designation.14  Mason County had required all forestland to be
141. See 1000 Friends of Wash. v. City of Anacortes, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 03-2-
0017, at 14-15,(Feb. 10, 2004); see also English v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Columbia County,
Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 93-1-0002 (Nov. 12, 1993).
142. See Diehl v. Mason County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 95-2-0073 (Jan. 8, 1996).
143. Easy v. Spokane County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 96-1-0016 (Apr. 10, 1997); see
also Twin Falls, Inc. v. Snohomish County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 93-3-0003c at 21 (Sept.
7, 1993).
144. City of Des Moines v. Puget Sound Reg'l Council, 97 Wash. App. 920, 932, 988 P.2d
993, 1000 (1999) (stating "[o]ur conclusion also garners support from an interpretation by
[CTED]").
145. Id. at 934 n.20, 988 P.2d at 1001 n.20, (quoting Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings
Bd., 85 Wash. 2d 441,448,536 P.2d 157, 161 (1975)).
146. Easy v. Spokane County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 96-1-0016 (Apr. 10, 1997); see
also Twin Falls, Inc. v. Snohomish County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 93-3-0003c, at 21
(Sept. 7, 1993).
147. Manke Lumber Co., Inc. v. Diehl, 91 Wash. App. 793, 959 P.2d 1173 (1998), review
denied, 137 Wash. 2d 1018, 984 P.2d 1033 (1999).
148. Compare WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-190-050 (2006) with § 365-190-060; compare
WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70.170(1)(a) (2006) with § 36.70A. I 70( I)(b).
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contiguous 5,000-acre tracts of land (improperly termed by the court as
"parcels").1 49 In finding the tract-size threshold met the GMA require-
ments, the Court of Appeals specifically stated that "[t]he GMA sets
forth objectives and minimum guidelines that local governments must
follow when classifying land., 150 Thus, the Court of Appeals held the
minimum guidelines were much more than advisory: the guidelines were
mandatory.
In Lewis County v. Western Washington Growth Management
Hearings Board, the Washington Supreme Court adopted the Court of
Appeal's approach in Manke Lumber.151 Lewis County had designated
agricultural land by solely considering the agriculture industry's antici-
pated land needs without regard for the CTED guidelines. 52 The court
first updated the Redmond two-part test by adding a third prong: whether
the land was "already characterized by urban growth."' 53 Then the court
explicitly adopted Manke Timber's approach: "While this court has not
previously interpreted RCW 36.70A.030(10), we approve of the ap-
proach used by the Court of Appeals in Manke Lumber Co. v. Diehl."',
54
The court then analyzed whether Lewis County's approach satisfied the
CTED guidelines defining "long-term commercial significance."'' 55 In its
analysis, the court first merely stated that "counties may consider the...
factors enumerated in WAC 365-190-050(1).y156 Then, it indicated that
when considering the CTED guidelines, local governments can assign
greater weight to certain factors but not to the exclusion of others:
Because the GMA does not dictate how much weight to assign each
factor in determining which farmlands have long-term commercial
significance, and because RCW 36.70A.030(10) includes the possi-
bility of more intense uses among factors to consider, it was not
"clearly erroneous" for Lewis County to weigh the industry's an-
ticipated land needs above all else.
However, we do not decide whether Lewis County, in focusing on
the needs of the local agriculture industry, went beyond the
149. Manke Lumber, 91 Wash. App. at 797, 959 P.2d at 1176.
150. Id. at 804-05,959 P.2d at 1179-80.
151. Lewis County v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 157 Wash. 2d 488, 139 P.3d
1096 (2006).
152. Id. at 499, 139 P.3d at 1101.
153. Id. at 502, 139 P.3d at 1103. The phrase was actually already part of the statutory defini-
tion, but omitted from the prior Redmond test. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.170(1)(a).
154. Lewis County, 153 Wash. 2d 501, 139 P.3d at 1102.
155. id. at 503, 139 P.3d 1102-04.
156. Id. at 503, 139 P.3d at 1103.
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considerations permitted by WAC 365-190-050 and RCW
36.70A.030 in designating agricultural lands. Unfortunately, Lewis
County's briefs do not explain the extent to which the county ap-
plied the specified factors. 57
After Lewis County, at the very least, local governments "must do
more than catalogue lands that are physically suited to farming in fulfill-
ing their responsibilities under the GMA. They must also consider [the
factors of the CTED guidelines] to decide whether land has enduring
commercial quality for agricultural purposes." 158 One likely impact of
Lewis County is that the Central and Eastem Boards will adopt the West-
ern Board's position: local governments must consider each CTED
guideline factor and, based on the evidence, justify any deviation from
the guidelines. 59
There is one more impact of Lewis County. Although the Washing-
ton Supreme Court allowed "Lewis County to weigh the industry's an-
ticipated land needs above all else,"'160 the court believed that local gov-
emments must give at least some weight to each CTED guideline factor.
The Supreme Court's analysis of Lewis County's agricultural land des-
ignation bears this out. The County used a threshold soil quality for des-
ignating agricultural lands.161 In effect, this threshold, without any coun-
tervailing considerations, eliminated many acres of productive agricul-
tural land from designation. The court opined that this single factor
could not be determinatively used:
For example, in not designating Christmas tree farms as agricultural
land because they do not depend on a particular soil type, the county
could have been considering the soil composition factor listed in
[RCW section] 36.70A.030(10). But in light of the Christmas tree
industry's relatively robust $19.8 million in annual sales, it is not
apparent why Lewis County would "consider" soil in this way, ex-
cluding productive tree farms from designated agricultural lands
simply because they don't need the types of prime soil that other
farm sectors need,
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. Snohomish County v. Hensley, No. 55693-2-1 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2007) (quoting
Lewis County, 157 Wash. 2d 488, 502, 139 P.3d at 1102-03).
159. See Diehl v. Mason County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 95-2-0073 (Jan. 8, 1996);
see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE 365-190-050(2) (2006).
160. Lewis County, 157 Wash. 2d at 503, 139 P.3d at 1103.
161. Lewis County would not designate any land as agricultural unless the soil was "prime"
even though several significant crops, such as Christmas trees, successfully grew in soils of lesser
quality. Id. at 494-96, 504,139 P.3d at 1099, 1104.
162. Id., 139 P.3d at 1104.
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Thus, not only must local governments consider each factor in the CTED
guidelines; the local governments must also give at least some weight to
each factor. This weighing is important to ensure that the weighing of a
single factor does not exclude all other factors.
Despite the holding of Lewis County, the GMA only requires local
governments to consider the CTED minimum guidelines for designating
resource lands and critical areas. 63  Thus, CTED will continue to have
little authority for interpreting the GMA outside of that context. The
duty to interpret the GMA goals and requirements will remain with the
local governments and the hearings boards. Therefore, in order to de-
termine the success of enforcing the GMA requirements, it is important
to create judicial tests, rely on precedents, and determine the boards' au-
thority to interpret the GMA.
B. Boards' Bright Lines
As discussed above, the hearings boards are tasked with interpret-
ing the GMA. 64 Hearings boards sometimes elicit a judicial test or
bright line that provides necessary "certainty and predictability [to cre-
ate] a safe harbor in the tumultuous sea of GMA."'165 Certainty is needed
to provide Boards with easier and more consistent decision-making proc-
ess, local governments with the knowledge of the GMA's bounds, and
developers with the ability to calculate whether their projects net-out.
"But there is constant tension between the need and desire for certainty
163. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.050, .170(2) (2006).
164. See supra Part II.
165. Kaleas v. Normandy Park, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 05-3-0007c, at 16-17 (July
19, 2005). Joe Tovar explained how growth boards have attempted to provide guidelines and a
framework in which local governments can work:
So we tried to write for a lay audience for the boards; we didn't try to make people look
like they were overly technical, loaded with legal jargon. We wrote for a broad audience
and it's interesting, some of the criticisms that I read were that, you guys are writing for
more than just the parties in the case, you're not just answering A wins, B loses. Well,
we talked about that for a while and agreed with it. Yeah, we weren't just writing for A
and B, we were writing for anybody who wanted to look at that decision and a lot of
things did go up. So if the judge wanted to look at what we were saying, we tried to lay
out our reasoning for why we were saying what we were saying. Then I took on as a
personal crusade to let planning practitioners know what the board had said on a subject
so that before you planned again, you had the benefit of someone else's experience on
what has passed muster and what hasn't.
Interview by Diane Wiatr with Joe Tovar, President, Wash., President, City Planning Directors, (July
17, 2005) available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/orahistory/pdf/OH833.pdf. Dick Ford also
added that "[r]ight, wrong, or indifferent, they provided guidance to local planning agencies and the
land use bar so they could understand what the ground rules were. And if people didn't like that
guidance, then they'd have to move into the court system or Legislature to get it changed."
Interview by Rita R. Robison with Dick Ford, chair (1989-90) of the Wash. State Growth




and the need and desire for flexibility."166 Flexibility is often framed as
allowing local governments to consider local circumstances. The neces-
sity for flexibility may be due to a number of factors, including genuine
desire to do innovative planning, pressure from business interests to al-
low additional development, or desire to expand the tax base. The more
deference afforded to local governments correspondingly leads to less
authority for hearings boards to interpret and enforce the GMA. Judicial
tests are one means of ensuring certainty. Therefore, determining the
bounds of boards' authority is critical to the success of Futurewise and
the GMA's goal of well-planned communities.
The legislature chose to give CTED limited rulemaking authority
and similarly limited the hearings boards' authority to adjudicate. This
limitation reflected the legislature's desire for a "bottom-up" approach. 167
Some developers and local governments have complained that hearing
board decisions that create judicial bright line tests step over the bounds
of the boards' interpretive duties. There are three areas of concern when
it comes to whether boards overstep their authority when creating judi-
cial tests. First, when do hearings boards overstep their adjudicatory au-
thority into the realm of legislation? Second, do bright lines infringe on
local governments' ability to consider local circumstances? Third, do
bright lines change the petitioner's burden of persuasion or the hearings
boards' standard of review? After answering these three questions, this
section will analyze current case law on bright lines and propose a logi-
cal interpretation and application of bright lines and judicial tests.
1. Adjudicative or Legislative
The GMA provides no differentiation between the boundaries of
adjudication and legislation. Therefore, in order to answer the question
of whether "bright lines" impermissibly step over the line from adjudica-
tion to legislation, we look to the Washington Administrative Procedure
Act (APA). The Washington Supreme Court in McGee Guest Home,
Inc. v. Washington Department of Social & Health Services stated that
"[w]hether an agency's action is rule-making, despite bearing some other
label, is determined under the APA."' 168 Hearings boards are considered
"agencies" under RCW section 34.05.010(2).169 Thus, it matters naught
166. Normandy Park, GMHB No. 05-3-0007c at 16-17.
167. McGee, supra note 1, at 10-14.
168. McGee Guest Home, Inc. v. Wash. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 142 Wash. 2d 316,
321, 12 P.3d 144, 147 (2000).
169. "Agency" is defined in the statute:
Agency means any state board, commission, department, institution of higher education,
or officer, authorized by law to make rules or to conduct adjudicative proceedings,
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that the legislature created the hearings boards solely to adjudicate. If a
hearings board steps over the line from adjudication into rulemaking, it
oversteps its authority.
The APA defines an adjudication proceeding as "a proceeding be-
fore an agency in which an opportunity for hearing before that agency is
required by statute or constitutional right before or after the entry of an
order by the agency." 170 Rulemaking is defined as "the process for for-
mulation and adoption of a rule., 171 The APA defines a rule as:
any agency order, directive, or regulation of general applicability (a)
the violation of which subjects a person to a penalty or administra-
tive sanction; (b) which establishes, alters, or revokes any proce-
dure, practice, or requirement relating to agency hearings; (c) which
establishes, alters, or revokes any qualification or requirement relat-
ing to the enjoyment of benefits or privileges conferred by law; (d)
which establishes, alters, or revokes any qualifications or standards
for the issuance, suspension, or revocation of licenses to pursue any
commercial activity, trade, or profession; or (e) which establishes,
alters, or revokes any mandatory standards for any product or mate-
rial which must be met before distribution or sale.
Thus, if a hearing board establishes a bright line test, it is foresee-
able that the test might create a standard which thereby makes a rule pur-
suant to three of the qualifiers, (a), (b), or (c). However, the hearings
boards are supposed to base their decisions on the goals and require-
ments of the GMA. 173 So long as the boards base their decisions on the
goals and requirements of the GMA, they are not establishing new "re-
quirement(s) relating to the enjoyment of benefits or privileges" and
should not implicate (a) or (b). For this reason, bright line tests are not
likely to be legislative in nature.
2. Impediment to Considering Local Circumstances
The second question, when must hearings boards defer to local
governments' interpretations, hinges on two claims by critics. First,
some developers and local governments argue that judicial tests infringe
upon the GMA's decentralized framework in which hearings boards
must defer to "local decisions" unless the decisions are clearly
except those in the legislative or judicial branches, the governor, or the attorney general,
except to the extent otherwise required by law and any local governmental entity that
may request the appointment of an administrative law judge under chapter 42.41 RCW.







erroneous. 174 This argument suggests that "local decisions" include deci-
sions regarding interpretation of the GMA. This ignores the fact that
boards do not review "local decisions" but rather "local actions.' ' 175 As
already described, the fact that "local action" may necessarily require the
local government to interpret the GMA, and the fact that the board is re-
viewing this action, does not preclude the hearings boards from interpret-
ing the GMA themselves.1
76
Critics also argue that even if hearings boards need not give defer-
ence to local decisions, the judicial bright line tests infringe upon local
governments' right to make decisions based on "local circumstances.' 77
The GMA allows local governments to consider "local circumstances" in
a few situations.1 78  These situations are discussed below regarding
"bright lines in practice."
a. Bright Lines in Practice: Densities
Hearings boards have established judicial bright line tests to deter-
mine whether a certain density is too dense for a rural or resource area or
too dense for an urban area.' 79 The GMA has goals of reducing sprawl
and encouraging urban growth, along with requirements to designate ur-
ban growth areas (UGAs), rural areas, natural resources lands, and criti-
cal environmental areas. It would seem strange that local governments
could permit any level of density they desired.
For that reason, hearings boards established judicial bright line tests
to ensure that densities in rural areas are rural in nature, densities in ur-
ban areas are urban in nature, and densities in agricultural and forestlands
do not impede or infringe on farming and forestry practices. In City of
Moses Lake v. Grant County, the Eastern Board stated: "[W]ith one nar-
row exception, this Board has consistently found that anything under 5-
acre lots is urban. Clearly 2.5-acre lots are the clearest vehicle of
sprawl." 8 In Vashon-Maury v. King County, the Central Board held,
"Any residential pattern of 10 acre lots, or larger is rural .... Any smaller
rural lots will be subject to increased scrutiny by the Board to assure that
174. Futurewise v. Pend Orielle County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 05-1-0011, at 8
(Nov. 1, 2006).
175. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320(3).
176. See supra Part 11.B.4.
177. Futurewise, GMHB No. 05-1-0011, at 8 (Nov. 1, 2006).
178. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.070(5)(a), .110(2), .3201.
179. See infra notes 182-85.
180. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.020(l), .020(2), .030, .040, .050, .060, .110.
181. City of Moses Lake v. Grant County, Final Order on Remand, GMHB No. 99-1-0016
(Apr. 17, 2002).
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the pattern of such lots ... will not . . . [b]e inconsistent with the goals
and requirements of the Act." 182 In Bremerton, the Central Board held,
"[A]ny residential pattern of four net dwelling units per acre, or higher, is
compact urban development and satisfies the low end of the range re-
quired by the Act. Any larger urban lots will be subject to increased
scrutiny."'1 83 In LMI/Chevron, the Central Board held that "a future land
use map designation for residential development that permits 4 du/ac
[dwelling units per acre] within city limits (UGA) is an appropriate urban
density [while] 1 du/2 ac within city limits (UGA) is not an appropriate
urban density and constitutes sprawling low-density development.' 84
Thus, there are numerous examples of judicial bright line tests created
for certainty and judicial economy.
Critics argue that these tests violate the GMA's requirement that lo-
cal governments be allowed to consider local circumstances. 185  The
GMA provides, "Because circumstances vary from county to county, in
establishing patterns of rural densities and uses, a county may consider
182. Vashon-Maury v. King County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 95-3-0008c, at 79 (Oct.
23, 1995); see also City of Bremerton v. Kitsap County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 95-3-
0039c (Oct. 6, 1995) ("A pattern of I- and 2.5-acre lots meets the Act's definition of urban growth..
.. However, a pattern of 1- or 2.5-acre lots is not an appropriate urban density either.... An urban
land use pattern of I- or 2.5-acre parcels would constitute sprawl; such a development pattern within
the rural area would also constitute sprawl"); Sky Valley v. Snohomish County, Final Dec. & Order,
GMHB No. 95-3-0068c, at 46 (Mar. 12, 1996) ("A pattern of 10 acre lots is clearly rural and the
Board now holds that, as a general rule, a new land use pattern that consists of between 5- and 10-
acre lots is an appropriate rural use .... ); 1000 Friends of Wash. v. Snohomish County, Final Dec.
& Order, GMHB No. 04-3-0018 (Dec. 13, 2004) ("However, by adding manufactured homes on lots
of less than 10 acres, the County permits a growth level in rural areas that the ... Boards have con-
sistently found to constitute sprawl."); Diehl v. Mason County, 94 Wash. App. 645, 656, 972 P.2d
543, 548 (1999) ("Respondents cite to several Board decisions that have specifically stated that 1-
acre to 2.5-acre lot sizes are per se urban densities, and rural densities should average 10 to 80 acre
lots.... The Board's determination that the rural element of Mason County's CP is oversized and
allows for urban growth in RACs is supported by the record.").
183. City of Bremerton v. Kitsap County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 95-3-0039c, at 50
(Oct. 6, 1995).
184. Lawrence Michael Invs., LLC v. Town of Woodway, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 98-
3-0012, at 24 (Jan. 18, 1999); see also Forster Woods Homeowners' Ass'n v. King County, Final
Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 01-3-0008c, at 31 (Nov. 6, 2001) ("It is undisputed that four dwelling
units per acre constitutes compact urban growth."); Master Builders Ass'n of Pierce County v. Pierce
County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 02-3-0010, at 15 (Feb. 4, 2002) ("It is generally accepted,
and not disputed here, that 4 dwelling units per acre is an appropriate urban density."); Kaleas v.
Normandy Park, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 05-3-0007c, at 16-17 (July 19, 2005) ("The
Board's formulation of the 4 du/acre density as an appropriate urban density has withstood the test of
time. For a decade it has provided a basis for coordinated planning and the necessary certainty and
predictability for GMA planning ...."); Fuhriman v. City of Bothell, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB
No. 05-3-0025c, at 23-24 (Aug. 29, 2005) ("Once again it is not disputed by any of the parties that 4
du/ac is an appropriate urban residential density.").
185. Futurewise v. Pend Orielle County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 05-1-0011, at 8
(Nov. 1, 2006).
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local circumstances." 186 This could have created a limit on hearings
boards' authority to interpret the GMA, but the legislature added that
local governments "shall develop a written record explaining how the
rural element harmonizes the planning goals in [RCW section]
36.70A.020 and meets the requirements of this chapter."' 87  The re-
quirement for a written record demonstrates that the legislature did not
intend that the local governments be exempted from the goals and re-
quirements. Indeed, because hearings boards supersede local govern-
ments' authority to interpret the GMA, hearings boards possess the au-
thority to determine what constitutes adequate rural densities to fulfill the
requirements of RCW section 36.70A.070(5) and the goals of encourag-
ing urban development and reducing urban sprawl.18
8
Furthermore, facts can be so universal as to create a legal require-
ment.18 9 A bright line test for density is one such area of law. The ques-
tion of what density is too dense for a community is often a factual one.
But clearly some boundaries can be created without specificity to each
county. A broad collection of social and economic data and studies can
illuminate what generally will never be acceptable. As hearings boards
increasingly make similar decisions based on these studies, a "pattern of
decisions" will arise creating a legal boundary which even the most lo-
calized justification cannot cross.
b. Bright Lines in Practice: Market Factors
In sizing UGAs, counties must first select a twenty-year population
projection to correctly size their UGAs for the estimated need for hous-
ing and employment.' 90 Counties may increase this size based on a "rea-
sonable land market supply factor."'191 However, the hearings boards
must determine what is reasonable for a market factor.
The Central Board in Bremerton created a bright line test for de-
termining market factors. "While it is difficult to draw an absolute limit
beyond which a county may not go in using such a factor, the Board
holds that a 'market factor bright line' will be drawn at the twenty-five
186. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(5)(a) (2006).
187. Id.
188. § 36.70A.020(1)-(2).
189. See, e.g., WASH. R. EvID. § 201(b) (A court may take judicial notice of a fact if"not sub-
ject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of
the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned").
190. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A. 110(2).
191. Id.
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percent threshold."'1 92 Effectively, this allowed up to a twenty-five per-
cent excess capacity beyond that needed for the project population, em-
ployment, and housing. For anything beyond twenty-five percent, the
board would ask three questions:
(1) What is the magnitude of the "land supply market factor" be-
yond the 25 percent bright line?...
(2) Is there other evidence to suggest that the land supply market
factor is not reasonable?...
(3) Has the county also availed itself of other approaches, such as
continuously monitoring land supply and making necessary adjust-
ments over the life of the plans for the county and its cities? 193
Thus, the Central Board created a judicial bright line test of a twenty-five
percent market factor threshold, beyond which the market factor would
be subject to greater scrutiny.
Critics argue that this bright line test infringes upon local govern-
ment's ability to consider "local circumstances." 194 The GMA provides
that "[i]n determining this market factor, cities and counties may con-
sider local circumstances. Cities and counties have discretion in their
comprehensive plans to make many choices about accommodating
growth." 195 The critics' argument is improvident, however. While local
governments may consider local circumstances and make many choices,
their discretion is still bounded by the GMA goals and requirements.
The section does not limit hearings boards' ability to interpret the
GMA.
196
3. Changing the Standard of Review
and Burden of Persuasion
What is of most concern regarding the bright lines is whether the
hearings boards impermissibly change the standard of review or burden
192. City of Bremerton v. Kitsap County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 95-3-0039c (Oct. 6,
1995).
193. Id.
194. Futurewise v. Pend Orielle County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 05-1-0011, at 8
(Nov. 1, 2006).
195. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A. 110(2) (2006).
196. Hearings boards must still allow local governments to "consider local circumstances" and
"have discretion to make choices in their comprehensive plans to make many choices about accom-
modating growth." WASH. REV. CODE. §§ 36.70A.070(5)(a); .110(2); .3201; .540. But the hearings
boards must also determine when local circumstance becomes local happenstance of political winds
and business pressure and when "many choices" becomes too many choices violating the GMA's
goals and requirements. See § 36.70A.010.
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of proof. RCW section 36.70A.320(3) provides that boards only weigh
local actions based on the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. Addi-
tionally, the burden of persuasion cannot be changed from the original
assignment, which section 36.70A.320(2) assigned to the petitioners.1
97
Changing these standards would be an impermissible legislative exercise
by the boards, violating the non-delegation doctrine. 198 This Section will
analyze the market factor and density tests to determine whether the
boards' "bright lines" impermissibly change the standard of review or
shift the burden of persuasion.
The concern with Bremerton has less to do with the test than with
the Central Board stating that "[t]he greater the degree the county's land
supply exceeds the twenty-five percent bright line, the more closely the
Board will scrutinize the record."'199 "More closely scrutinize" may act
to reduce the standard of review or shift the burden of persuasion. 200 Al-
though the Central Board may not have chosen its language wisely, the
overall effect was that the Central Board was shifting the burden of pro-
duction by requiring the county to provide more evidence and justifica-
tion.
The difference between "more closely scrutinizing" and "shifting
the burden of production" is simply a matter of perspective and therefore
is of little consequence. If a board indicates that it will more closely
scrutinize the record, the local government must produce more evidence
and justification. On the flip side, if a board requires the local govern-
ment to produce more evidence, the court will likely scrutinize the record
more closely. Thus, scrutinizing more closely is synonymous with shift-
ing the burden of production.
The market factor test does not impermissibly heighten the quan-
tum of proof. Requiring more evidence is different than changing the
quantum of proof. On the balancing scale of fact-finding, a petitioner
must provide enough evidence to surmount the quantum of proof and the
197. But see § 36.70A.320(4) (providing an exception to subsection (2) when a local govern-
ment is justifying an action to fix a previous action which the board found invalid).
198. 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND.
PROCEDURE § 8365 (2008); see also Diehl v. Mason County, 94 Wash. App. 645, 661-63, 972 P.2d
543, 551-52 (1999) (holding the GMA was not unconstitutionally vague and that the legislature's
delegation of review authority to hearings boards did not violate the separation of powers doctrine);
Snohomish County v. Anderson, 124 Wash. 2d 834, 838-41, 881 P.2d 240, 243-44 (1994) (holding
constitutional claims that GMA violated separation of powers and granted an excessive delegation of
power to the governor to impose penalties for noncompliant localities were not ripe for review).
199. City of Bremerton v. Kitsap County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 95-3-0039c (Oct. 6,
1995) (emphasis added).
200. Typically, the more a court scrutinizes a lower decision, the more likely the court may
reverse it. Mayes, et al., supra note 13, at 34.
2008]
Seattle University Law Review
respondent's evidence. 20  Essentially, the Central Board in Bremerton
found that twenty-five percent equaled the weight of the clearly errone-
ous quantum. Each additional percentage point of a market factor is an
additional grain of sand on the petitioner's side of the fact-finding scale.
Clearly, the test does not heighten the quantum of proof or standard of
review, but merely reflects the evidentiary nature of market factors.
The market factor test also does not impermissibly shift the burden
of persuasion. Even when a hearings board more closely scrutinizes a
local action, requiring the respondent local government to produce more
evidence, the petitioner still retains the burden of persuading the trier of
fact that the evidence does not exculpate the respondent.
4. Viking Properties
Viking Properties, Inc. v. Holm threw into question whether hear-
202ings boards can establish bright line rules. In July 2002, Viking
bought a 1.46-acre lot located within a subdivision subject to a restrictive
20covenant. 03 The relevant portion of the restrictive covenant is that it
restricted development to "[one] single-family, detached private house
on each half-acre [of the subdivision]. 20 4 Three months after purchasing
the lot, Viking's president requested that the homeowners in the subdivi-
sion execute a release of the covenant, which all of the homeowners re-
fused to do.205 Viking thereafter filed a declaratory judgment action in
King County Superior Court.20 6 After discovery, Viking moved for par-
tial summary judgment.20 7 One of Viking's arguments was that the
GMA, as interpreted by the hearings boards, created a public policy fa-
voring higher densities and, thus, the density limitation covenant was
against public policy and unenforceable. 208 The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment.20 9 The homeowners moved for reconsideration, which
was denied; they appealed directly to the Washington Supreme Court.210
In the Supreme Court, Viking argued that the decision in Bremerton
imposed a "bright line" minimum, establishing a GMA public policy.
21'
The Supreme Court reversed, providing four reasons why the density
limitation did not violate public policy: (1) the GMA did not impose
201. Id.
202. Viking Props., Inc. v. Holm, 155 Wash. 2d 112, 118 P.3d 322 (2005).
203. Id. at 15, 118 P.3d at 324.
204. Id.





210. Id. at 118, 118 P.3d at 325-26.
211. Id. at 129, 118 P.3d at 331.
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"bright line" minimums; (2) "the GMA create[d] a general 'framework'
to guide local jurisdictions instead of 'bright line' rules"; (3) the denser
zoning regulations did not compel property owners to develop more
densely; and (4) the city's planning manager "determined that the cove-
nant was not in irremediable conflict with city policy. '21 2 The first two
reasons may serve to establish the precedent that hearings boards may
not create bright lines to aid them in resolving cases.
It is questionable whether Viking Properties was intended to limit
hearings boards' abilities to use bright lines in their decisions. The court
provides two sentences explaining its first reason in support of its con-
clusion that the GMA did not impose a bright line.213 The first sentence
is, "The growth management hearings boards do not have authority to
make 'public policy' even within the limited scope of their jurisdictions,
let alone to make statewide public policy." 214 This is a reaction to Vi-
king's argument that the hearings boards' decisions establish a public
policy counter to the covenant.
It is certainly true that hearings boards have no discretion to create
policy. 21 5 However, bright lines should be construed not as public pol-
icy, but as zones of validity. Thus, the Viking court did not say that hear-
ings boards cannot interpret the GMA, but rather (1) the zones do not
establish "statewide public policy," and (2) the hearings boards' deci-
sions have no force outside the scope of the GMA context.
Expounding on this latter logic, the court continued: "The hearings
boards are quasi-judicial agencies that serve a limited role under the
GMA, with their powers restricted to a review of those matters specifi-
cally delegated by statute. 216 Here the court is saying that the decisions
of the hearings boards have no weight outside of the GMA and the doc-
trine of servitudes. This is fundamentally different than saying hearings
boards have no authority to interpret the GMA and establish judicial tests
for decision-making.
The court's second reason, that "the GMA create[d] a general
'framework' to guide local jurisdictions instead of 'bright line' rules," is
problematic.21 7 Again, the court is not likely saying that hearings boards
cannot interpret the GMA and establish judicial tests, but rather that be-




215. Id.; see also Futurewise v. Pend Orielle County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 05-1-
0011, at 8 (Nov. 1,2006).
216. Viking Props., 155 Wash. 2d at 129, 118 P.3d at 331.
217. Id.
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GMA itself can be considered as creating public policy. Because the
GMA is a "general framework" without bright line rules, the restrictive
covenant cannot violate a GMA bright line public policy.
The court provides an example attempting to explain this second
reason: "[T]he existence of restrictive covenants that predate the enact-
ment of the GMA and limit density within the urban growth areas are the
type of 'local circumstances' accommodated by the GMA's grant of a
'broad range of discretion' for local planning." 218 This, however, is a
strange explanation. The existence of restrictive covenants has little to
do with whether the GMA establishes a general framework or bright line
rules. Rather, the court is making the statement that restrictive covenants
are the equivalent of other local circumstances, such as the local topog-
raphy, hydrology, economy, and community character. RCW section
36.70A.3201 provides that "local comprehensive plans and development
regulations require counties and cities to balance priorities and options
for action in full consideration of local circumstances., 219 The following
question then arises: Did the court in Viking Properties mean that local
governments' discretion of local circumstances should preempt all hear-
ings boards' interpretations and tests of the GMA's goals and require-
ments? Evidently not, as the court cites to King County v. Central Puget
Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Board, which held that "[1]ocal discre-
tion is bounded, however, by the goals and requirements of the GMA.' 22°
Reading the Viking Properties sentence independently does not yield the
conclusion that the hearings boards cannot establish bright lines or judi-
cial tests. Read in conjunction with the preceding sentence, it actually
weakens the overall argument that the court meant to restrict hearings
boards' exercise of judicial tests and creation of bright lines.
Finally, and most notably, the court never expressly overrules any
of the hearings boards' decisions that establish bright lines and judicial
tests. The court mentions Bremerton v. Kitsap County, which established
the market factor bright line of twenty-five percent and a three-part test,
but the court does not say that this was an invalid exercise of discretion
by the Central Board.221 Instead, the court explained why the Bremerton
bright line was inapplicable to the case at bar regarding restrictive cove-
nants.222
218. Id.
219. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.3201 (1997).
220. King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 543, 560,
14 P.3d 133, 142 (2000).
221. Viking Props., 155 Wash. 2d 112, 129, 118 P.3d at 331 (citing Bremerton v. Kitsap
County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 95-3-0039 (Oct. 6, 1995)).
222. Id. It is also indicative that Viking Properties was limited to the issue of invalidation of
restrictive covenants due to public policy is the citations by law and restatements. Nearly all
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5. Viking Properties' Effect
Although the Washington Supreme Court apparently did not intend
to restrict the hearings boards' abilities to interpret the GMA, set bright
lines, and create judicial tests, the effect of Viking Properties has been
just that. Petitioners to hearings boards have been reluctant to cite to any
bright lines created by the hearings boards.223 Hearings boards have been
similarly reluctant to decide cases based on bright lines. One example is
Kaleas v. City of Normandy Park. Normandy Park adopted a Compre-
hensive Plan that permitted low residential densities of 2.2, 2.9, and 3.5
224dwelling units per acre. Futurewise and property owners John Kaleas
and Bruce Horst petitioned the Central Board for review.225 The Central
Board held that the designations were clearly erroneous given that they
were less than the four units per acre bright line of Bremerton.226 Nor-
mandy Park appealed to King County Superior Court.227  The Superior
Court held that Viking Properties established "that the Board does not
have the authority to impose a "bright line" rule of a minimum four
dwelling units per acre ... as defining appropriate urban density. 228
The Superior Court also stated that "the Board erred in finding the City
of Normandy Park's comprehensive plan land use designations out of
compliance with GMA. 229
On remand "for entry of an order consistent with this decision,
2 30
the Central Board had little choice but to enter an order of compliance.
secondary sources citing to Viking Properties concern restrictive covenants and not hearings boards.
See 34 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 3d § 339 (2008); 39 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 3d § 377 (2008); 42
AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 3d § 463 (2008); REAL ESTATE LAW DIGEST §§ 7:1, 7:14 (4th ed. 2007);
17 WASH. PRAC. SERIES §§ 3.2, 4.2 (2006); 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12:2 (4th ed. 2006);
EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING & PLANNING § 82:7 (Supp. 2007);
Keeping Current: Property, 20 FEB PROB. & PROP. 24, 24 (2006). In addition, many cases concern-
ing restrictive covenants have cited to Viking Properties. See Alpine Quality Constr. Servs., Inc. v.
Johnson, Nos. 32153-0-11 & 33093-8-Il, 2006 WL 2262027, *5 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2006);
Cingular Wireless, LLC v. Thurston County, 129 P.3d 300, 308 n.7 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
223. Interview with Tim Trohimovich, Planning Dir., 1000 Friends of Wash., in Seattle, Wash.
(Sept. 2006).
224. Kaleas v. Normandy Park, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 05-3-0007c, at 21-22 (July
19, 2005); see also Kaleas v. Normandy Park, Order on Remand, GMHB No. 05-3-0007c, at 8 (July
31, 2006) (McGuire, Bd. member, dissenting) (which shows the numbers as 2.0, 2.7, and 3.25 den-
sity units per acre).
225. Kaleas v. Normandy Park, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 05-3-0007c, at 2 (July 19,
2005).
226. Id. at 16-17, 23 (citing City of Bremerton v. Kitsap County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB
No. 95-3-0039c (Oct. 9, 1995)).
227. Id. at 1.
228. Kaleas v. Normandy Park, No. 05-2-27090-0, at 2-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 2006)
(Final Order & Judgment).
229. Id. at 3-4.
230. Id. at 4.
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Notably, one of the three board members dissented, saying that the
Board, absent the ability to review based on previous bright lines, should
pursue further inquiry into whether the designations comply with the
231GMA's goals and requirements.
The Superior Court's decision in Normandy Park is troubling.
First, the court provided no reasoning as to why Viking Properties ap-
plied in this case. This case is outside the context of the Supreme
Court's analysis in Viking regarding why hearings boards' decisions are
inapplicable to the establishment of a public policy invalidating restric-
tive covenants. Second, and more importantly, the decision seems to
have changed how hearings boards view themselves. The Central
Board's decision on remand demonstrates that hearings boards believe
Viking Properties restricts their ability to interpret the GMA, and must
concede to local governments' decisions based on their "local circum-
stances." However, as demonstrated by the above analysis of Viking
Properties, this reasoning is incorrect.
6. Post- Viking Properties
a. Ferry County
Two subsequent Supreme Court decisions suggest that Viking
Properties was not intended to have the effect that the Superior Court in
Normandy Park gave it. In Ferry County v. Concerned Friends of Ferry
County,232 the court analyzed how to determine whether a county com-
plied with the Best Available Science (BAS) requirement.233 The court
held that the Court of Appeals was correct to use the Western Board's
test.234 The Western Board, although not establishing a clear definition
or bright line for BAS, had established a three-part test.235 Thus, the Su-
preme Court believes that the hearings boards have discretion to interpret
the GMA and establish judicial tests. While the court did not explicitly
approve the use of bright lines, there is a murky distinction between
bright lines and judicial tests; it is unlikely the court will attempt to make
a distinction.
231. Kaleas v. Normandy Park, Order on Remand, GMHB No. 05-3-0007c, at 7-10 (July 31,
2006) (McGuire, Bd. member, dissenting).
232. Ferry County v. Concerned Friends of Ferry County, 155 Wash. 2d 824, 123 P.3d 102
(2005).
233. WASH REV. CODE § 36.70A.172(1) (2003).
234. Ferry County, 155 Wash. 2d at 834-38, 123 P.3d at 107-09.




In Lewis County v. Western Washington Growth Management
Hearings Board., which concerns designating agricultural lands, Lewis
County allowed each farm to have a five-acre "farm center" where rural
commercial and industrial uses would be permitted.236  The Supreme
Court upheld the Western Board's invalidation of non-farm uses within
an agricultural designation. 237 In doing so, the court seemed to create a
bright line of its own:
The problem with the county's approach is that any farmer could
convert any five acres of farmland to more profitable uses, even if
such conversion would remove perfectly viable fields from produc-
tion. Thus it was clearly erroneous to exclude from designation ag-
ricultural lands up to five acres on every farm, without regard to
soil, productivity or other specified factors in each farm area.
Not only did the six-member majority never mention Viking Properties,
the majority seemed to attack the dissent's assertion of Viking Properties
several times. 239 The dissent led its opinion by stating that the
GMA was not intended to be a top-down approach with state agen-
cies (or GMA Boards) dictating requirements to local entities.
Thus, in accordance with the legislative language of the act, we
have held that the GMA does not prescribe a single approach to
growth management. RCW 36.70A.3201; Viking Props. v. Holm,
155 Wash.2d 112, 125-26, 118 P.3d 322 (2005) ("'the ultimate
burden and responsibility for planning, harmonizing the planning
goals of [the GMA], and implementing a county's or city's future
rests with that community"' (alteration in original) (quoting RCW
36.70A.3201)).
Thus, the GMA is implemented exclusively by city and county
governments and is to be construed with the flexibility to allow lo-
cal governments to accommodate local needs. Viking Props., 155
Wash.2d at 125-26, 118 P.3d 322.240
The three-member dissent implied that because the GMA gives the
sole authority of planning to local governments, local governments have
the authority to interpret the GMA. The dissent made several leaps of
236. Lewis County v. Western Washington Growth Management Hearings Bd., 157 Wash. 2d
488, 495, 139 P.3d 1096, 1099 (2006).
237. Id. at 509, 139 P.3d at 1106.
238. Id. at 505, 139 P.3d at 1104 (emphasis added).
239. Id. at 494 n.1, 498 n.7, 506 n.16, 508 n.17, 139 P.3d at 1098 n.1, 1100 n.7, 1104 n.16,
1105 n.17.
240. Id. at 512, 139 P.3d at 1107 (J.M. Johnson, J., dissenting).
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logic to reach this assertion. First, the dissent cited Quadrant to say that
no deference is to be given to hearings boards' decisions that do not
properly defer to local decisions. 24' The dissent then added that hearings
boards are limited in their authority because they can only review peti-
tions regarding natural resource and critical area designations, UGA des-
ignation, and comprehensive plans, development regulations, and shore-
line master plans. In addition, the dissent implied that hearings boards
cannot reach issues regarding the constitution, equity, or impact fees.242
Moreover, the dissent implied that hearings boards' decisions are less
credible because board members "are not judicial or legislative offi-
cers." 243  After making these statements, the dissent made a jump in
logic, saying the county's decisions should be upheld without stating
how the Western Board misapplied its deference to local decisions.
The majority retorted, "[r]ather than apply the APA standard of re-
view, the dissent simply offers bare assertions, i.e., '[t]he uses that the
Board found noncompliant are actually consistent with the GMA' to jus-
tify its conclusion that the Board erred. Dissent at 1111.,,244 The Lewis
County dissent was advocating a "bottom-up" approach without any
"up." The majority stated:
It seems that the dissent would bypass the Board and allow counties
to decide whether their own actions comply with the GMA. For ex-
ample, the dissent complains that "unelected boards" may "micro-
manage land use plans for counties." Dissent at 1107 n.1. While
bypassing the Board certainly would promote the dissent's goal of
"allowing the ... local government to govern" it would contradict
the intent of the legislature for a q uasi-judicial body to evaluate
GMA compliance. Dissent at 1109.
Not only was there no "up," but the dissent forewent any deference to the
Board's decisions based on Quadrant, which provided that "a board's
241. Id. at 513,139 P.3d at 1108 (citing Quadrant Corp. v. State Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd.,
154 Wash. 2d 224, 238, 110 P.3d 1132, 1139 (2005).
242. Id. Somehow the dissent failed to mention that Viking Properties held that hearings
boards cannot make public policy either. See Viking Props., Inc. v. Holm, 155 Wash. 2d 112, 117,
118 P.3d 322, 325 (2005).
243. Lewis County, 157 Wash. 2d at 513, 139 P.3d at 1108 (J.M. Johnson, J., dissenting). The
dissent failed to mention that the regionalization of the boards and the requirement for three mem-
bers with local government and planning experience, one who must be a lawyer and one who must
be a former elected local official, was a conscious decision by the legislature to provide regional
differences and more expertise to decision-making. As described above in the history of the GMA,
the legislature intended the boards to be a quicker and wiser review procedure than the court process.
If anything, courts should give more deference to hearings board decisions.
244. Id. at 508 n.17, 139 P.3d at 1106 n.17.
245. Id. at 494 n.l, 139 P.3d at 1098 n.1 (majority opinion).
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ruling that fails to apply this 'more deferential standard of review' to a
county's action is not entitled to deference from this court.
246
The dissent's error is three-fold. First, as described above, the dis-
sent did not say how the Western Board did not give deference to Lewis
County. When multiple issues are before a hearings board, a board's
decision may fail to give proper deference to particular local actions but
give proper deference to other actions. In these cases, a court should
continue to defer to the portions of the board decisions that gave proper
deference. Second, when the hearings board did not properly defer to
local actions, the court still must apply the APA standards of review.
Third, if the hearings board misapplied deference to local actions, the
logical decision by a court would be to remand to the board for a deci-
sion pursuant to the proper standard of review, especially considering the
legislature's requirement that hearings boards have expertise and region-
alization.
7. Reaching past Gold Star
Ferry County and Lewis County demonstrate that a majority did not
intend for Viking Properties to prohibit bright line judicial tests or
change the standard of review. As the Supreme Court changes member-
ship, how the GMA is interpreted in light of Viking Properties will be of
great importance. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals has indicated
some confusion as to how to proceed. In Gold Star Resorts, Inc. v. Fu-
turewise,247 the court stated that
Viking is obviously distinguishable, involving as it does an effort to
use Board rulings to invalidate a private covenant, but Gold Star's
point is well taken. In the absence of legislative guidance, the
boards are left to adopt some consistent approach. But guidelines
are one thing and bright line rules are another.
The Board did not order any particular planning outcome or the ap-
plication of any particular definition of rural density, but rather re-
manded to the county for further review. Upon that review, the
principles of Viking should be considered. 48
246. Quadrant Corp., 154 Wash. 2d at 237, 110 P.3d at 1139 (quoting Lewis County, 157
Wash. 2d at 513, 139 P.3d at 1108 (J.M. Johnson, J., dissenting)).
247. Gold Star Resorts, Inc. v. Futurewise, 140 Wash. App. 378, 166 P.3d 748 (2007).
248. Id. 166 P.3d at 758-59.
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For those who fear that local decisions will be influenced by eco-
nomic pressure to expand the tax base or by business pressure to allow
unnecessary development, the Gold Star decision should be quite worri-
some. The sooner the courts understand the inapplicability of Viking
Properties to hearings board decisions, the sooner private citizens and
petitioners will be able to resume their role as GMA enforcers.
The Gold Star concurring opinion laid out a clearer view of "bright
line" rules and Viking Properties, although different than the zone of va-
lidity analysis that we propose below. In his concurring opinion, Judge
Agid stated:
I write separately to clarify a misconception that has crept into the
case law concerning the Growth Management Hearings Boards'
(Boards) adoption of a "bright line rule" governing urban and rural
densities under the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter
36.70A RCW. While the Central Puget Sound Board did use that
unfortunate term in its Bremerton v. Kitsap County decision, a cur-
sory review of its decision establishes that it was really adopting a
rebuttable presumption that certain proposed densities did not con-
form to the GMA's definitions of and criteria for urban and rural ar-
249eas.
As Judge Agid noted, hearings boards have generally not applied a
"bright line" rule in the traditional manner of applying the rule without
considering anything else. Instead, the hearings boards have generally
used the "bright line" rule in the context of evaluating factual evidence in
the record relating to that particular county. For example, in a pre-Viking
Properties case, City of Moses Lake v. Grant County, the Eastern Board
held that
[w]ith one narrow exception, this Board has consistently found
that anything under 5-acre lots is urban. Clearly 2.5-acre lots
are the clearest vehicle of sprawl. Scattering these small lots
around cities would continue what the GMA is trying to stop.
Services cannot be easily provided; each will have their own
well, septic tank and other limited infrastructure. This size lot
is one of the most difficult to bring into a city if annexed. 50
Thus, although other decisions had found the density adopted by Grant
County to be urban, it was the local circumstances that governed the
Eastern Board's decision: the need for urban services, the difficulty in
annexation, and the sprawling nature of 2.5-acre lots.
251
249. Id. 166 P.3d at 759 (Agid, J., concurring).





Similarly, in a post- Viking Properties case, the Eastern Board found
Kittitas County's rural densities noncompliant. 252 Even though all three
boards had previously held that one dwelling unit per three acres was not
a rural density, the Eastern Board found Kittitas County's densities non-
compliant based upon evidence in the record, including the need to pro-
vide urban water and sewer service at that density, incompatibility with
natural resource lands, and predominant farm size in the County.
253
It is unclear whether Judge Agrid's "rebuttable presumption" is the
approach other hearings boards have actually used to evaluate evidence
before them. A rebuttable presumption would usually mean that the bur-
den of persuasion shifts to the County once a petitioner points out that a
given density is outside of the presumption. 254  In particular, hearings
boards have not handled petitions for review related to density in this
way. Although other board decisions are referenced, each hearing board
has generally held petitioners to the standard of producing factual evi-
dence from the record to demonstrate that the County erred in adopting a
particular density. 255 Thus, it appears that the hearings boards have nei-
ther been applying bright line rules nor rebuttable presumptions when
referencing prior decisions. Instead, the hearings boards have treated
other decisions as merely advisory opinions, much as one trial court
judge might consider another trial court judge's ruling on similar facts. 56
8. Zone of Validity for Local Discretion
Regardless of the hearings boards' approach to using bright lines in
practice, there is a strong argument for the bright lines to stand on their
own. Judicial bright line tests should always be considered valid when
the tests create zones within which local actions are always permissible.
For example, tests permit all densities below one unit per ten acres in
rural areas,257 all densities above four residential units per acre in urban
252. Kittitas County Conservation v. Kittitas County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 07-1-
0004c (Aug. 20, 2007).
253. Id. at 7-9, 15-16.
254. A rebuttable presumption is "an inference drawn from certain facts that establish a prima
facie case, which may be overcome by the introduction of contrary evidence." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1224 (8th ed. 2004). This is the updated definition.
255. E.g., Kittitas County Conservation v. Kittitas County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No.
07-1-0004c (Aug. 20, 2007).
256. The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to Board decisions, although they are ex-
pected to follow some degree of uniformity in resolution. Vergeyle v. Employment Sec. Dept., 28
Wash. App. 399, 404, 623 P.2d 736, 739 (1981) (although stare decisis plays only a limited role in
the administrative agency context, agencies should strive for equality of treatment), overruled on
other grounds, Davis v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 108 Wash. 2d 272, 737 P.2d 1262 (1987).
257. Diehl v. Mason County, 94 Wash. App. 645, 656, 972 P.2d 543, 548 (1999).
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areas, 258 and all market factors below twenty-five percent in sizing urban
growth areas.259 These tests proscribe any petitioner's claim that a den-
sity or market factor within these zones do not comply with the GMA.
Hearings boards should be able to rely on bright lines that were cre-
ated either (1) based on scientific and academic evidence; (2) based on
authority of prior case law; 260 or (3) based on a negative argument.
26 1
Once established, bright lines create zones in which local governments
can rest assured that any designation will not be overturned by a petition
to a hearings board. Providing this protection to local governments helps
ensure efficient use of government resources and provides appropriate
deference to local governments.
The Washington Supreme Court in Lewis County implicitly under-
stood the importance of creating zones of local discretion. In Lewis
County, the Western Board found that Lewis County's allowance for
five-acre "farm-centers" on each farm did not comply with the GMA.262
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Lewis County claimed that the Board
had prescribed a 'per se prohibition' on all nonagricultural uses" in ag-
ricultural areas 263 and the dissent similarly opined that the Board had
"prescribe[d] a single approach to growth management., 264 The majority
disagreed, stating that the board's finding of noncompliance "is different
from requiring a particular form of zoning or flatly prohibiting all non-
farm uses. In sum, Lewis County has not been stripped of the ability to
use innovative zoning techniques pursuant to RCW 36.70A.177, as it
contends., 265  Thus, although the Western Board prohibited five-acre
farm-centers, the County still may take local action within a large zone
of discretion.
258. Forster Woods Homeowners' Ass'n v. King County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 01-
3-0008c, at 31 (Nov. 6, 2001).
259. City of Bremerton v. Kitsap County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 95-3-0039c (Oct. 6,
1995).
260. This, as described above, is essentially how the boards are approaching bright line ques-
tions. See Master Builders Ass'n of Pierce County v. Pierce County, Final Dec. & Order, GMHB
No. 02-3-00 10, at 15 (Feb. 4, 2002) ("It is generally accepted, and not disputed here, that 4 dwelling
units per acre is an appropriate urban density.")
261. E.g., a rural area cannot include urban growth. See City of Bremerton v. Kitsap County,
Final Dec. & Order, GMHB No. 95-3-0039c, at 79 (Oct. 6, 1995) ("A pattern of 1- and 2.5-acre lots
meets the Act's definition of urban growth .... [S]uch a development pattern within the rural area
would also constitute sprawl.") (emphasis added).
262. Panesko v. Lewis County, Order Finding Noncompliance & Imposing Invalidity, GMHB
No. 00-2-0031c, at 18-20 (Feb 13, 2004).
263. Lewis County v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd.,157 Wash. 2d 488, 507, 139 P.3d
1096, 1105 (2006).
264. Id. at 511, 139 P.3d at 1107 (J.M. Johnson, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 507, 139 P.3d at 1105 (majority opinion).
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Based on Lewis County, boards should not be hindered from using
judicial bright line tests. As long as the hearings board (1) only deter-
mines which actions are noncompliant based on the factual circum-
stances and (2) leaves a zone of choices within which local governments
may exercise discretion, the hearings board decision is valid.
IV. CONCLUSION: SUGGESTIONS TO STRENGTHEN THE GMA
As the concluding article to a two-part series, we finish with a few
thoughts. Based on the oral histories of key players in the creation of the
GMA, the original legislatures in 1990 and 1991 clearly desired a "bot-
tom-up" approach relying on decentralized enforcement through the ef-
forts of private citizens. 266 This two-part series has not made any serious
effort to question that approach. Instead, this second article has empha-
sized that if the decentralized enforcement is to continue to possess effi-
cacy, efforts must be doubled in gaining and protecting (1) the ability for
CTED to create minimum guidelines that must be followed by local gov-
ernments, and (2) the ability for growth management hearings boards to
rely on precedent to establish general standards, even when called
"bright lines." We recommend the following courses of action to ensure
that decentralized enforcement remains viable:
(1) Hearings boards and courts, or the Washington State Legisla-
ture, should better delineate among the burden of persuasion, bur-
den of production, quantum of proof, and standard of review. This
delineation would appropriately reflect how the burden of persua-
sion stays with the petitioner and how the burden of production
shifts at a certain point. An understanding of this delineation would
cut down on the common mistake made by boards and respondents
in stating that the burden of proof cannot shift. As long as this con-
fusion remains, the door remains open for a court to let the confu-
sion adversely affect decentralized enforcement.
(2) The state legislature should establish the CTED guidelines as the
minimum requirements to which all local governments must abide.
In addition, CTED should be allowed to create rules that summarize
hearings boards' decisions and judicial bright line tests in order to
promote judicial and administrative economy.
(3) Courts should embrace the hearings boards' bright line tests.
Bright line tests are an important function for judicial economy;
266. McGee, supra note 1, at 10-14, 26-30.
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they create certainty for local governments and developers and al-
low hearings boards to exercise interpretive duties.
These three suggestions will carry out the Legislative intent for lo-
cal participation and enforcement of the GMA goals and requirements,
permitting decentralized management subject to general statewide base-
line requirements.
